This document provides a simple outline from where all projects regarding internet, data and information spectrum domination are derived. From SOPA to NDAA to drones the GLOBAL SMART GRID is just as advertized. SMART.
Now the universal internet ID will be coming this year behind NSTIC and the Commerce Department as part of the climate change/HAARP type cover program called Identity Ecosystem Governance which is just full spectrum IO surveillance
Information Operations, Electronic Warfare and Cyberwar: Capabilities and Related Policy Issueshttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31787.pdf 2007 DOD Information Operations Core Capabilities DOD identifies five core capabilities for conduct of information operations; (1) Psychological Operations, (2) Military Deception, (3) Operations Security, (4) Computer Network Operations, and (5) Electronic Warfare. These capabilities are interdependent, and increasingly are integrated to achieve desired effects. Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
DOD defines PSYOP as planned operations to convey selected information to targeted foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.5For example, during the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), broadcast messages were sent from Air Force EC-130E aircraft, and from Navy ships operating in the Persian Gulf, along with a barrage of e-mail, faxes, and cell phone calls to numerous Iraqi leaders encouraging them to abandon support for Saddam Hussein. At the same time, the civilian Al Jazeera news network, based in Qatar, beams its messages to well over 35 million viewers in the Middle East, and is considered by many to be a “market competitor” for U.S. PSYOP. Terrorist groups can also use the Internet to quickly place their own messages before an international audience. Some observers have stated that the U.S. will continue to lose ground in the global media wars until it develops a coordinated strategic communications strategy to counter competitive civilian news media, such as Al Jazeera.6 Partly in response to this observation, DOD now emphases that PSYOP must be improved and focused against potential adversary decisionmaking, sometimes well in advance of times of conflict. Products created for PSYOP must be based on in-depth knowledge of the audience’s decision-making processes. Using this knowledge, the PSYOPS products then must be produced rapidly, and disseminated directly to targeted audiences throughout the area of operations.7 DOD policy prohibits the use of PSYOP for targeting American audiences. However, while military PSYOP products are intended for foreign targeted audiences, DOD also acknowledges that the global media may pick up some of these targeted messages, and replay them back to the U.S. domestic audience. Therefore, a sharp distinction between foreign and domestic audiences cannot be maintained.8 Military Deception (MILDEC) Deception guides an enemy into making mistakes by presenting false information, images, or statements. MILDEC is defined as actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers with regard to friendly military capabilities, thereby causing the adversary to take (or fail to take) specific actions that will contribute to the success of the friendly military operation. As an example of deception during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the U.S. Navy deployed the Tactical Air Launched Decoy system to divert Iraqi air defenses away from real combat aircraft. Operational Security (OPSEC) OPSEC is defined as a process of identifying information that is critical to friendly operations and which could enable adversaries to attack operational vulnerabilities. For example, during OIF, U.S. forces were warned to remove certain information from DOD public websites, so that Iraqi forces could not exploit sensitive but unclassified information. Computer Network Operations (CNO) CNO includes the capability to: (1) attack and disrupt enemy computer networks; (2) defend our own military information systems; and (3) exploit enemy computer networks through intelligence collection, usually done through use of computer code and computer applications. The Joint Information Operations Warfare Command (JIOWC) and the Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare (JFCCNW) are responsible for the evolving mission of Computer Network Attack.9 The exact capabilities of the JIOWC and JFCCNW are highly classified, and DOD officials have reportedly never admitted to launching a cyber attack against an enemy, however many computer security officials believe the organization can destroy networks and penetrate enemy computers to steal or manipulate data, and take down enemy command-and-control systems. They also believe that the organization consists of personnel from the CIA, National Security Agency, FBI, the four military branches, and civilians and military representatives from allied nations.10 Computer Network Defense (CND) CND is defined as defensive measures to protect information, computers, and networks from disruption or destruction. CND includes actions taken to monitor, detect, and respond to unauthorized computer activity. Responses to IO attack against U.S. forces may include use of passive information assurance tools, such as firewalls or data encryption, or may include more intrusive actions, such as monitoring adversary computers to determine their capabilities before they can attempt an IO attack against U.S. forces. Some DOD officials believes that CND may lack sufficient policy and legal analysis for guiding appropriate responses to intrusions or attacks on DOD networks. Therefore, DOD has recommended that a legal review be conducted to determine what level of intrusion or data manipulation constitutes an attack. The distinction is necessary in order to clarify whether an action should be called an attack or an intelligence collection operation, and which aggressive actions can be appropriately taken in self-defense. This legal review should also determine if appropriate authorities permit U.S. forces to retaliate through manipulation of unwitting third party computer hosts. And finally, DOD has recommended structuring a legal regime that applies separately to domestic and to foreign sources of computer attack against DOD or the U.S. critical. infrastructure.11 Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) CNE is an area of IO that is not yet clearly defined within DOD. Before a crisis develops, DOD seeks to prepare the IO battlespace through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and through extensive planning activities. This involves intelligence collection, that in the case of IO, is usually performed through network tools that penetrate adversary systems to gain information about system vulnerabilities, or to make unauthorized copies of important files. Tools used for CNE are similar to those used for computer attack, but configured for intelligence collection rather than system disruption. Computer Network Attack (CNA) CNA is defined as effects intended to disrupt or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks. As a distinguishing feature, CNA normally relies on a data stream used as a weapon to execute an attack. For example, sending a digital signal stream through a network to instruct a controller to shut off the power flow is CNA, while sending a high voltage surge through the electrical power cable to short out the power supply is considered Electronic Warfare (However, a digital stream of computer code or a pulse of electromagnetic power can both be used to also create false images in adversary computers). During Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. and coalition forces reportedly did not execute any computer network attacks against Iraqi systems. Even though comprehensive IO plans were prepared in advance, DOD officials stated that toplevel approval for several CNA missions was not granted until it was too late to carry them out to achieve war objectives. 12 U.S. officials may have rejected launching a planned cyber attack against Iraqi financial computers because Iraq’s banking network is connected to a financial communications network also located in Europe. Consequently, according to Pentagon sources, an information operations attack directed at Iraq might also have brought down banks and ATM machines located in parts of Europe as well. Such global network interconnections, plus close network links between Iraqi military computer systems and the civilian infrastructure, reportedly frustrated attempts by U.S. forces to design a cyber attack that would be limited to military targets only in Iraq.13 In a meeting held in January 2003, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, White House officials sought input from experts outside government on guidelines for use of cyber-warfare. Officials have stated they are proceeding cautiously, since a cyberattack could have serious cascading effects, perhaps causing major disruption to networked civilian systems.14 In February 2003, the Bush Administration announced national-level guidance for determining when and how the United States would launch computer network attacks against foreign adversary computer systems. The classified guidance, known as National Security Presidential Directive 16, is intended to clarify circumstances under which a disabling computer attack would be justified, and who has authority to launch such an attack. Electronic Warfare (EW) EW is defined by DOD as any military action involving the direction or control of electromagnetic spectrum energy to deceive or attack the enemy. High power electromagnetic energy can be used as a tool to overload or disrupt the electrical circuitry of almost any equipment that uses transistors, micro-circuits, or metal wiring.15 Directed energy weapons amplify, or disrupt, the power of an electromagnetic field by projecting enough energy to overheat and permanentlydamage circuitry, or jam, overpower, and misdirect the processing in computerized systems. The Electronic Warfare Division of the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office has responsibility for creating electronic warfare policy, and for supporting development of new electromagnetic spectrum concepts that can be translated into equipment and weapons.
Domination of the Electromagnetic Spectrum.
DOD now emphasizes maximum control of the entire electromagnetic spectrum, including the capability to disrupt all current and future communication systems, sensors, and weapons systems. This may include: (1) navigation warfare, including methods for offensive space operations where global positioning satellites may be disrupted; or, (2) methods to control adversary radio systems; and, (3) methods to place false images onto radar systems, block directed energy weapons, and misdirect unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs) or robots operated by adversaries.16For example, recent military IO testing examined the capability to secretly enter an enemy computer network and monitor what their radar systems could detect. Further experiments tested the capability to take over enemy computers and manipulate their radar to show false images.17 For example, recent military IO testing examined the capability to secretly enter an enemy computer network and monitor what their radar systems could detect. Further experiments tested the capability to take over enemy computers and manipulate their radar to show false images.17
Electromagnetic Non-Kinetic Weapons.
Non-Kinetic Weapons emit directed electromagnetic energy that, in short pulses, may permanently disable enemy computer circuitry. For example, an electromagnetic non-kinetic weapon mounted in an aircraft, or on the ground, might disable an approaching enemy missile by directing a High Power Microwave (HPM) beam that burns out the circuitry, or that sends a false telemetry signal to misdirect the targeting computer.18
Also at reduced power, electromagnetic non-kinetic weapons can also be used as a non-lethal method for crowd control.
The Active Denial System (ADS), developed by the Air Force, is a vehiclemounted nonlethal, counter-personnel directed energy weapon. Currently, most non-lethal weapons for crowd control, such as bean-bag rounds, utilize kinetic energy. However, the ADS projects a focused beam of millimeter energy waves to induce an intolerable burning sensation on an adversary’s skin, repelling the individual without causing injury. Proponents say the ADS is safe and effective at ranges between 50 and 1,600 feet. The nonlethal capabilities of the ADS are designed to protect the innocent, minimize fatalities, and limit collateral damage.19
The Pentagon reportedly has requested immediate deployment of at least 8 ADS devices to Iraq to assist Marines in guarding posts, countering insurgent snipers and protecting convoys. The ADS system would be the first operationally deployed directed-energy weapon for counter-personnel missions.20Some observers have stated that success in future conflicts will depend less on the will of governments, and more on the perceptions of populations, and that perception control will be achieved and opinions shaped by the warring group that best exploits the global media39. As a result of the increasingly sophisticated use of networks by terrorist groups and the potentially strong influence of messages carried by the global media, does DOD now view the Internet and the mainstream media as a possible threat to the success of U.S. military missions? How strongly will U.S. military PSYOP be used to manipulate public opinion, or reduce opposition to unpopular decisions in the future? Another emerging issue may be whether DOD is legislatively authorized to engage in PSYOP that may also affect domestic audiences. 40 DOD Joint Publication 3-13, released February 2006, provides current doctrine for U.S. military Information Operations, and explains the importance of achieving information superiority.41 However, the DOD Information Operations Roadmap, published October 2003, states that PSYOP messages intended for foreign audiences increasingly are consumed by the U.S. domestic audience, usually because they can be re-broadcast through the global media. The Roadmap document states that, “…the distinction between foreign and domestic audiences becomes more a question of USG (U.S. Government) intent rather than information dissemination practices (by DOD).”42 http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/NSTICstrategy_041511.pdf http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/download/attachments/28049411/NSTIC+Stakeholders+Update.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1328191895000 http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=8499 http://www.carlisle.army.mil/dime/documents/AY12%20IO%20Primer%20FINAL%20CD.pdf http://www.carlisle.army.mil/dime/documents/AY12%20IO%20Primer%20FINAL%20CD.pdf https://cotocrew.wordpress.com/2010/12/22/more-from-the-big-blue-omnibus/ https://cotocrew.wordpress.com/2011/12/22/more-from-the-big-blue-omnibus-again/